The moment was always coming. Not just from the point at which Rishi Sunak steamrollered the Windsor Framework through parliament last March; but from the point at which Boris Johnson gave his imprimatur to the NI Protocol in October 2019.
Over the last four years the DUP has been involved in a series of on-again, off-again negotiations with three prime ministers and governments, trying to persuade each of them in turn to ‘undo the constitutional damage done to Northern Irelands position within the union’.
When Jeffrey Donaldson became leader of the party in June 2021 his three priorities were: to unite the party (after the fallout from the defenestration of Foster and Poots); push up its level of support in opinion polls (which had plunged to 13% at one point); and negotiate a solution to the Irish Sea border and EU law applying to NI and not GB.
In fairness to him he did manage to unite the party and push up the levels of support, but at the expense of having to promote an assembly boycott policy to which he was never emotionally nor strategically committed.
Today, though, the party is divided and coming under intense external pressure from the likes of the TUV and elements of loyalism.
More worryingly for Donaldson is the increasing evidence that the negotiations—which the UK government insists are over—don’t appear to have delivered anything substantial. The Framework remains as it was and the changes to red and green lanes are, in the words of his internal opponents, ‘purely cosmetic’.
This territory will be very familiar to Donaldson. Hours before the GFA was signed off he resigned from the UUP negotiating team, claiming that David Trimble hadn’t delivered enough for unionism, was dividing the party and, in the long term, was potentially damaging the Union by conceding too much in a number of areas.
Some negotiators have said that had he stayed it might have been much more difficult for Trimble to sign up when he did.
Like Trimble, indeed like Paisley and Robinson in 2006/7, Donaldson now has to present the entire deal to his party. That moment, put off for so long, is now unavoidable. The level of briefing and counter-briefing since early December has finally forced his hand; yet by staying his hand at that moment he may have strengthened the hand of both internal and external opponents yesterday and in the days to come.
He has allowed the mice to shred the deal before most of his MLAs and key players at constituency level have had a chance to see it. And in so doing he has allowed opponents to set the media agenda.
Trimble would never have done that. Irrespective of what people may think about Trimble he didn’t mind confrontation; he wasn’t afraid to face down those in his parliamentary party working against him and he more than held his own at meeting after meeting of the party’s executive and governing council. Donaldson could learn some lessons from Trimble’s approach.
If the moment is unavoidable, then so too is what might be described as the ‘Donaldson decision.’ He has to decide if he is prepared to take on all-comers, risk defections and force people out of their comfort zones in order to back him.
He must give them the confidence to back him, even if that support may bring problems for them at constituency level. Waverers will not be won over by an obvious lack of hard sell or frontline commitment to the decision.
It’s at times like this that leadership legacies and reputations are forged. He may win or he may lose this particular battle: the important thing is to take the decision and face the moment.
What he does in the next few days will steer the fortunes of both devolution and the union. It’s a challenging time for him, with huge pressure and the likelihood of friendships crushed into dust. So be it. That’s both the demand and price of leadership.