REGULAR readers of this column and of my broader commentary will know that I have always said three things about the DUP.
They don't want or support a hard border; they don't want or support a 'no deal' Brexit; and they will not support anything which raises constitutional difficulties for Northern Ireland - although they were/are prepared to support the so-called 'backstop' as long as there is an easy and unilateral mechanism for the United Kingdom to extricate itself from it if a resolution can't be found within a specified time period.
They don't support a hard border because they know that it would raise enormous political difficulties in Northern Ireland, as well as making it very hard to kickstart a talks process and reboot the Assembly.
The DUP wants the Assembly up and running. It wants a settled Northern Ireland. It wants talk of a border poll damped down. It wants a unionist First Minister in place.
And it wants all of this because the centenary of Northern Ireland's creation is just over two years away and the DUP wants something to celebrate.
For those same reasons they don't want a 'no deal' either; for that really would be uncharted territory.
A deal does, at the very least, offer something which would resemble clarity and certainty.
The situation since Theresa May triggered Article 50 - without a baldy about what her "Brexit means Brexit" actually meant - has been 24/7 uncertainty: and most business people and economists will tell you that it's uncertainty that does the most damage to business confidence and necessary preparation for changed circumstances.
So a 'no deal' outcome really doesn't help the DUP; or anyone else for that matter.
A 'backstop' - which came as a bolt-from-the-blue to the DUP in December 2017 - was never going to be a runner for a unionist party, particularly if it led to a situation in which Northern Ireland was treated by the EU as some sort of soi-disant, standalone entity, significantly different to the rest of the United Kingdom.
That said, the DUP, supported by Jacob Rees-Mogg and Boris Johnson did try and produce a solution; much the same as the original 'backstop' proposal, but with a rock-solid time limit and exit route if negotiations went badly. That, as we know, was unacceptable to the EU.
There has been criticism of the DUP for saying that the Union trumps all else.
The Union is always above all else for unionists; the clue is in the name.
Eventual Irish unity trumps everything else for Sinn Féin. Independence trumps everything else for the Scottish National Party.
So why would anyone be surprised that their identity, that sense of who they are, matters so much to unionists?
Indeed that identity and sense of who they are was also at the heart of the vote of millions of those who chose Remain; and remains at the heart of a clear majority of those MPs trying to steer Brexit in their preferred direction.
At the time of writing - Thursday morning - Theresa May is still insisting that she will bring her deal back for a third vote; although it still needs approval from the Speaker.
On Wednesday evening she offered to sack herself if her rebels backed her.
It was enough for some; making Rees-Mogg wobble and causing Boris Johnson to eat every single word he has said and written since June 23 2016.
As I always suspected, a Borgia has more sense of principle and loyalty than Boris.
Anyway, Theresa's fittingly surreal 'back my policy and I'll resign in gratitude' ploy didn't convince the hardcore ERG; so, short of turning herself into a piñata and inviting her enemies to beat her with sticks, I can't see the trickle becoming a flood.
The indicative vote process may not have produced a clear winner - although Ken Clarke's Customs Union option, defeated by just eight votes, and Margaret Beckett's second referendum on any withdrawal bill option, defeated by 27 votes, remain in play.
Significantly, Beckett's tally of 268 was more than the previous votes for May's Withdrawal Agreement.
Quite what happens now is anyone's guess. I've never expected a 'no deal' or a hard Brexit and that remains my view.
I never expected we would leave on March 29 - and there's a couple of people owe me money on that...
On June 27 2016, four days after the referendum, I suggested that the UK would either remain in the EU - probably by way of a second referendum - or go for a 'soft' leave, and find itself trapped in the constitutional equivalent of a granny-flat.
Again, that remains my view. But it is looking increasingly likely that a longer extension will be required before we reach something that can be called the final destination.
Even so, the political/electoral fallout will continue for decades.
