An old friend, who went on to be a very successful and influential figure in the UK business world, would, when we met up for a chat on his return visits to Northern Ireland, open every conversation with the same mantra: "I see they still haven't got it." The 'it' was his approach to a lifetime of meetings and negotiations: cut to the chase as soon as you sit in the chair and begin the conversation.
I was reminded of him when I read a recent piece by Simon Kuper in the Financial Times, the Seven Dos and Don'ts for Negotiating from Weakness. Don't lecture. Get it in writing. Understand your own weakness. Persuade your interlocutor that you share (or at least understand) their worldview. Don't show off. Zoom in on a feasible ask.
His seventh rule – if you can't speak your interlocutor's language at least speak excellent English – didn't seem immediately relevant to local negotiations, until I realised that in terms of political/constitutional negotiations we don't speak the same language.
All of which brings me to the DUP's ongoing dilemma with the government and NIO. Just after Boris Johnson had announced his 'oven ready' Brexit deal, including the NI Protocol, a senior Conservative asked me why the party was obsessed – his word – with lists and points and why it always seemed to be "looking over its shoulder at people not even in the party and who don't share its end goals".
It was a good point. Sometimes when you deal with the DUP it's hard to avoid the impression you're actually dealing with two or three parties sheltering under the same title; a problem which used to dog David Trimble when he was negotiating the Good Friday Agreement.
I think Jeffrey Donaldson – and most of the key figures in the party's leadership and MLA teams – accept that devolution is the best option for the party and for unionism generally. In fairness to him he makes the case for devolution in almost every speech and press statement.
He has been a devolutionist all his life and he's not about to change now. He doesn't want to be remembered as the unionist leader who pushed Northern Ireland back to direct rule; particularly when it would come in a form which would and could do no favours for unionism.
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I think, too, that there is no emotional attachment between either of the big two national parties and what I'll describe as 'Ulster' unionism. They don't understand us: and I'm not persuaded that they ever have understood us. And because they don't understand us they don't understand why unionism often lectures them, refuses to focus on feasible asks and, as in the case of Paisley Jnr's "milk and no sugar" jibe about Theresa May, too often prefers the show off throwaway line rather than the measured response.
That said, I don't think there is a genuine desire just to dump Northern Ireland. No country wants to give part of itself away, if only because it sends a dangerous message to other parts of the United Kingdom.
It's also worth bearing in mind that most of the evidence suggests there remains a pro-union majority here (Yes, I can hear the "Oh no there isn't..." response from some of you), so a unilateral dumping would probably create far greater problems for any government than the problems we have right now.
The greatest problem for Donaldson, as it was for Trimble and even Arlene Foster, is that he doesn't fully understand one particular weakness: he, like them, isn't just playing his own cards from his own hand. Some of the cards aren't even in his own deck, but held instead by players in different rooms, including the TUV, LCC, Orange Order and other elements of loyalism.
Some are even held by members of his Westminster parliamentary team (and he knows how irksome that can be, because he used to occupy that role when he was in the UUP).
He can't cut to the chase because he needs buy-in from a majority of those other card-holding players; some of whom make no secret of the fact that they don't want devolution in any shape or form.
So, when Donaldson enters any negotiation with the government about finding a route back to the assembly and executive, the government team knows his weakness from the outset. They know any decision he makes isn't just dependent on the DUP's imprimatur. They know that even a nod of approval from him won't, necessarily, amount to a hill of beans in the greater scheme of things.
When the DUP bought into the united rally approach at last May's assembly election (which actually saw the overall unionist vote and seat numbers fall, as well as damaging the DUP's clout) it also bought in to the input and influence of others who don't support a return to the assembly.
What is the 'chase' for the DUP? If it wants back to the assembly what price will it pay? If it doesn't want back, does it understand the consequences? Is it prepared to face-down its internal and external opponents?
What leverage does it have against the Prime Minister? Is it prepared to wait for a Labour government? Is it afraid to move in case yesterday's by-elections cripple Sunak and force an early general election? Is it stupid enough to believe another hung parliament would allow it to return to the role of kingmaker?
Or does it just assume the GFA and its political institutions are still considered too big to be seen to have failed, allowing it to trundle on for months with salaries (albeit reduced, but still handsome), expenses and titles in place?
I don't know the answer to any of those questions. Worryingly, I'm not sure if anyone else does, either.
