The result, said Brian Faulkner, “represents the fears of the unionists of Northern Ireland: fears about the unknown and the unknown expressed in that term Sunningdale. People know what the power-sharing executive is. They have seen us working and I haven’t heard in the whole election campaign any criticism of what we have been doing or what we are prepared to do.”
Ian Paisley had a different take: “We want the British government to have a general election on the Ulster assembly and for the new Northern Ireland Executive to present itself to the people.”
Meanwhile, Gerry Fitt claimed the election had “come much too early for the people of Northern Ireland to really begin to understand what Sunningdale means”.
They were talking about the UK general election on February 28 1974, called by PM Edward Heath to answer the question about who governed the UK: his government, or the Trades Union Congress. For anti-Sunningdale unionism/loyalism it was a godsend, allowing them to build their campaign on the devastatingly effective slogan ‘Dublin Is Just A Sunningdale Away’.
The power-sharing executive had only been running for a few weeks and many unionists still hadn’t adjusted to the shock of the closure of the NI Parliament in March 1972. The double-whammy of the SDLP (viewed by many as republicans) in government and the prospect of a Council of Ireland further down the line made unionism easy pickings for a United Ulster Unionist Council telling them the union and NI’s place within it were in danger.
Fear generally works on unionism – has done at key political/electoral moments since 1885 onwards. Faulkner and his power-sharing colleagues in the SDLP and Alliance (still an unambiguously pro-union party at that point) hadn’t had the chance to get enough done to persuade people, particularly unionists, that there was nothing to fear from this new form of governance.
Crucially, Faulkner had also resigned as leader of the UUP in January 1974, meaning the largest party of unionism was actually a key player within the UUUC. He hadn’t had time to kickstart a new party and establish the funding and organisation required to fight an election.
It was inevitable he would take a pounding. He was prepared for it. But what scuppered both Faulkner and power-sharing was the overall majority won by the UUUC. It may only have been a fairly modest victory (51.1%) but gave his opponents the mandate required to crush Sunningdale.
- Sunningdale Agreement at 50: Why the first major attempt at power-sharing was too-much, too-soon for unionistsOpens in new window
- Brian Feeney: The Good Friday Agreement was not ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’ - there was a fundamental differenceOpens in new window
- Unionism must learn to embrace change or die on the rock of fear – Alex KaneOpens in new window
Faulkner refused to resign, insisting the executive still commanded an overall majority within the assembly. The new Labour government, led by Harold Wilson, refused to negotiate with the UUUC. Three months later, after a 14-day strike, Faulkner, the executive, power-sharing and Sunningdale all collapsed.
One other thing collapsed on May 28 1974: the power of street-on-the-feet muscular unionism. It may have destroyed the 1973/74 power-sharing experiment, but it would never again be allowed to destroy any other process committed to by a UK government and underpinned with bi-lateral support at Westminster and buy-in from an Irish government.
The other lesson from 1974, one that has still to be learned in some quarters: unionism will never again be allowed to triumph in a battle with a British government
The Anglo-Irish Agreement, Downing Street Declaration and Framework Documents, along with a lengthy list of other understandings and nod-and-a-wink side deals post-1974, survived because the British had learned the lessons of May 1974.
The GFA survives because of lessons learned then. When the DUP acknowledged, albeit internally, there would be no major reworking of the agreement after the 1998 election, it shifted its position from ‘destroying this one-way ticket to a united Ireland’ to preparing for a ‘better, fairer deal’ in 2007. Indeed, there’s a case to be made that both the NI Protocol and Windsor Framework are also lessons learned from 1974 – ensuring, from the British end, that strategy is always, to all intents and purposes, destruction-proof.
The other lesson from 1974, one that has still to be learned in some quarters: unionism will never again be allowed to triumph in a battle with a British government.