There is a tendency across unionism to insist that the gap between the vote for electoral nationalism (around 40%) and the 50+1% required to win a border poll for Irish unity is so big — and so slow to move in the right direction — that a border poll is out of the question for decades.
And there is a tendency across nationalism to insist that unionism’s loss of a majority in the assembly, at Westminster and local council — with Sinn Féin emerging as the largest party — means that Irish unity is both inevitable and well down the road to completion.
Like all tendencies, though, these two need to be taken with an exceptionally large pinch of salt. In the absence of clarity on the precise terms and conditions required for a border poll, both sides place undue emphasis on the word “likely” in the relevant paragraphs of the Good Friday Agreement.
In other words, a poll won’t be called unless a secretary of state believes it “likely” (although we have no idea what criteria he would apply) that the Irish unity side would win.
So, unionists argue that 40% for electoral nationalism means there is no likelihood of a united Ireland; while nationalists argue that 43% for electoral unionism means there is, at least, a possibility that the pro-union side would lose. And that’s what the ongoing debate is all about: what do we mean by “likely”.
“Likely” wasn’t just a randomly chosen word. No words are, in an agreement whose purpose is to end conflict and pave the way to a new means of doing political/constitutional business. David Trimble would have described it as part of the “constructive ambiguity” required to get unionism/loyalism over the line. And Mark Durkan would have regarded it as part of the “ugly scaffolding” required to nudge nationalism/republicanism over their own separate lines.
But ambiguity and scaffolding don’t ever disappear, even in the template examples of conflict resolution. The best that can be hoped for is that civil/political/societal progress makes it easier to return to and resolve outstanding problems at some point. Yet we haven’t had that sort of progress in NI. Indeed, we’re not even close to that point. And that’s why we find it so hard to see anything other than the ambiguity and scaffolding. We focus on it, of course, because the root of the conflict — the constitutional question — continues to eclipse and predominate every other issue.
Whatever the outcome of a border poll, history — a long, long, long line of it — suggests that we’ll still have enormous difficulty living with each other
Let’s move away from tendencies, ambiguities and scaffolding for a moment, to another issue that tends to be forgotten about. Whether it be in the United Kingdom or a newly united (although many of you prefer the term reunited) Ireland, there will still be conflicting and fractious communities in this part of the island.
If a border poll ends in support for the present status quo, nationalism here will continue the push for a second poll. Their flame will not be extinguished. And if it results in a united Ireland, it would be fatuous to believe that the hundreds of thousands of unionists who rejected it at the poll would simply shrug their shoulders and leave the past behind them. Whatever the outcome of such a poll, history — a long, long, long line of it — suggests that we’ll still have enormous difficulty living with each other.
All of which brings me to what may become the two most important questions around the entire border poll issue. First, what are the criteria required for the poll and who will decide them? The British government? British and Irish governments? The secretary of state? The parties who negotiated the original agreement in 1998? To the best of my knowledge none of these questions are in the process of being answered and clarified. They will need to be.
Second, what happens after a border poll? If the status quo remains, nothing is resolved, because nationalism will be looking for clarification on the timing and criteria for the next one; while unionists will be saying, “Look, we told you, so let’s leave it for a few decades.” And if the status quo is ended then how, in reality, will unionists be accommodated. Is all of this resolved before the poll, or in a lengthy process afterwards?
Lessons should be learned from the ongoing damage of the ambiguity and scaffolding of 1998. Other lessons should be learned from the chaos of Brexit in 2016 (and the Irish referenda earlier this year). Sean O’Casey’s line about “a terrible state of chassis” is a wonderful one for the theatre: but it’s not so wonderful if you’re living it as part of everyday politics.
